People who have lived through the Cold War will remember that the threat to the security of NATO’s member states came from the East, namely the risk of an invasion by the Soviet Union. There was no real "crisis management" at that time, but there was careful NATO planning to counter that potential threat. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, this threat has given way to a broader array of concerns stemming from political and military developments that have since taken place. We are no longer talking about "a single threat," but about many threats and various risks that lead to “crises to be managed” or “emergencies to be addressed.” There is no doubt that the NATO security environment has become unpredictable. Today, the Alliance’s military planners aren't just looking at how to deal with invasions involving tanks, artillery, and missiles; for that there are plans proven through hundreds of drills and exercises. Instead, we talk about terrorist attacks, cyber-attacks, hybrid wars and disinformation campaigns that do not fit the old concept of conventional conflicts and territorial borders. Added to this are the new menaces of climate change, natural disasters, floods, earthquakes, fires and biological hazards (such as the COVID-19 pandemic) that have radically affected the stability of our security.

Many wonder whether the Alliance, with its civil-military structure and procedures, is capable of addressing all these challenges, and whether it should still act alone, given the reduction of military expenditures and the privatization of formerly government owned assets that have resulted in a heavy dependence on civilian resources, which are commercial in nature and not necessarily amenable to a military hierarchy. In practice, resources and critical infrastructure are now, in several areas, managed and owned by the private sector, certainly not governable by immediate command, and in many cases owned by transnational companies. NATO sources report that “around 90 per cent of military transport for large military operations is chartered or requisitioned from the commercial sector; on average, over 30 per cent of satellite communications used for defence purposes are provided by the commercial sector; and some 75 per cent of host nation support to NATO operations is sourced from local commercial infrastructure and services.” (NATO, June 2021)

In response to these challenges and limitations, the answer echoing throughout NATO circles is clear: “We Need More Resilient Societies!” This “call to arms” has become the leitmotif of allied meetings over the last decade. In fact, the principle of resilience is rooted in Article 3 of the Alliance’s founding treaty: “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” This has now taken on a newfound importance.

The resilience of each country is defined as the ability of its society to withstand and rapidly recover from natural disasters, hybrid attacks or failures of critical infrastructure, and requires both civilian and military readiness. While we already know and rely on the Allied military capabilities and their well-defined structures, we may know a bit less about the alchemy of the civilian realm. In fact, civilian preparedness has always been a topic of interest for the Alliance, but it has recently become a central pillar for allied resilience because it is a factor that can decisively influence NATO’s Collective Defense. Already at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, the Heads of State and Government (HoSG) had decided to relate resilience to the entire spectrum of threats, and since have continued to press for the development of individual and collective capacities to resist any form of armed attack. At the recent summit in Brussels, the HoSG reiterated their individual and collective commitment to support each ally in evaluating and improving their civilian preparedness. In sum, if on the one hand resilience is a national responsibility, on the other it becomes a “collective commitment” which is the foundation of any alliance. The better prepared the Allies are, the less vulnerable they are, and potentially less likely to be attacked, which makes NATO as a whole stronger.

Think about recent COVID pandemic. The global health crisis undoubtedly affected the security environment in which NATO is the main defender across its Area of Operation as well as its Area of Interest. In that regard, the pandemic has tested the Allied nations and their resilience in a unique way. Their reaction certainly had its positive facets, but it also revealed significant lessons to be learned. Among them is the importance of civil-military involvement and cooperation, which is now being carefully analysed in order to better prepare nations for responding to similar crises in the future. (For those not familiar with “NATO’s Baseline Requirements” on civil preparedness, which were agreed upon at the 2016 Summit, see the list below). These basic national resilience requirements were quite clear and self-explanatory, albeit in need an update in view of recent developments. The commitment of the Heads of State and Government at the Brussels Summit is equally well determined (see link). However, beyond beautiful words, we may need to reflect on how the individual capacities of the nations can be enhanced, and how/when national goals will be able to align themselves to the overall Alliance’s resilience goals so as to fulfil the promise of collective commitment.  

In the past, the magic word inside the Allied military world was “interoperability,” meaning the use of common standard operating procedures, a common NATO calibre for ammunitions, interoperable logistical tools, and many other examples. Yet we need to realize that it took decades to have a suitable Allied operational interoperability. What about the civil sector and the new unconventional and hybrid threats? Put simply, HoSG strongly committed the Alliance to address those increasingly pervasive hostile information activities, including disinformation, aimed at destabilising our societies and undermining our shared values; and attempts to interfere with our democratic processes and good governance. National political disruptions are quite evident, and we can also recognise that cyber activities could cross borders at the speed of light with no restrictions.  We must ask, can individual Allies address and manage these issues alone, or is there a need for supranational policy, tools, and action plans, beside national interventions, to ensure proper collective effectiveness? We may have to stay tuned on NATO-2030 program implementation to understand it. More to follow.

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NATO Baseline Requirements:

1. Assured continuity of government and critical government services: for instance the ability to make decisions, communicate them and enforce them in a crisis;

2. Resilient energy supplies: back-up plans and power grids, internally and across borders;

3. Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people, and to de-conflict these movements from NATO’s military deployments;

4. Resilient food and water resources: ensuring these supplies are safe from disruption or sabotage;

5. Ability to deal with mass casualties: ensuring that civilian health systems can cope and that sufficient medical supplies are stocked and secure;

6. Resilient civil communications systems: ensuring that telecommunications and cyber networks function even under crisis conditions, with sufficient back-up capacity. This requirement was updated in November 2019 by NATO Defence Ministers, who stressed the need for reliable communications systems including 5G, robust options to restore these systems, priority access to national authorities in times of crisis, and the thorough assessments of all risks to communications systems;

7. Resilient transport systems: ensuring that NATO forces can move across Alliance territory rapidly and that civilian services can rely on transportation networks, even in a crisis.