At the time of its founding in 1949, NATO’s objective was a simple one: “collective defense,” meaning that an attack against one ally would be considered an attack against all allies. This led to the realization among member states that if they wanted this to be credible, they needed to synchronize their efforts. The byword for this was “interoperability,” which manifested itself in myriad ways, such as having the same standard operating procedures, the same logistical arrangements, or the same type of weapons and ammunition. 

In the 1990s, the breakup of Yugoslavia raised concerns among the allies regarding potential threats to their territorial and democratic integrity. Consequently, NATO began to engage in what was termed “out-of-area” operations, which simply meant projecting force into an “area of interest.” While a controversial step for some members, this new responsibility transformed the concept of collective defense, while reaffirming and boosting NATO’s international role in the wake of the ColdWar. 

The events of September 11,2001 furthered the commitment to out-of-area operations and the extension of the area of interest. Hence, the terms “projecting stability” and“capacity building” came to represent the expansion of collective defense to atypical areas that served as havens for terrorists. This had obvious links with NATO’s long-term commitment to resilience, as expressed in Article 3 of its founding treaty. However, only recently has the significance of this article garnered attention and the need for “projecting resilience” or “forward resilience” come to the forefront of the discourse. 

In NATO’s long history, it is evident that new terms and concepts have been periodically introduced. Whilst they may have been disjointed in terms of understanding and function, all of them could be traced back to the Alliance’s core objective, again, that being collective defense.  

Second, the Alliance, in essence, provides its members with an insurance policy, one made possible by individual commitment to and burden sharing in collective defense. Whether it entails interoperability, stability projection, capacity building, national resilience enhancement, or forward resilience, collective defense requires investments at both national and collective levels. The consistency of the “premium” paid for a “collective insurance” will show itself in the Alliance’s strength. 

While the withdrawal of an ally from common funding obligations will produce a vulnerability, so too maya the “cost-lies-where-it-falls” principle. In essence, if national governments do not commit according to their capacities, vulnerability gaps can quickly emerge. Recent arguments over the Alliance’s required defense obligations (e.g. the 2% spending rule) and reluctance on the part of some to assist weaker allies with national priorities reveal a lack of foresight in some quarters regarding future crisis situations that could require NATO intervention.  

At its NATO Defense Ministers meetings in2020, the allies emphasized the importance of enhancing national and collective resilience. This certainly fit with our class on Crisis Management and Disaster Response, offered through the University of California Irvine, and prompted a lot of discussion among the students regarding resilience and NATO.From these discussions NATO cohesion and mutual assistance among its members merit attention. 

Put simply, assisting others in resilience efforts cannot be separated from NATO’s core objective, collective defense. If you’d like to learn more about NATO Crisis Management and Disaster Response (CMDR), enroll int he course at the University of California Irvine today.